windows-ad
Authorized Active Directory and Windows identity attacks: Kerberos abuse, AD CS escalation, BloodHound path analysis, NTLM relay, and domain privile…
它会碰到什么
这一栏是扫描器报的事实,不是结论。命中多不等于有毒(安全工具、规则库、示例脚本本来就会包含危险写法),命中少也不等于干净。它和你手上的凭据、文件、网络有什么关系,需要你自己看。
技能内容
> ⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY
> This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only.
> You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool.
> Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.
> Mandatory confirmation gate
> Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:
> 1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.
> 2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.
> 3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.
> 4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.
>
> Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.
Windows / Active Directory Security
When to Use
- Mapping and attacking AD trust paths in an authorized engagement.
- Researching escalation routes (AD CS, Kerberos delegation) in labs.
适用场景
- 域渗透、Kerberoasting、AS-REP、委派
- AD CS(ESC1–ESC8 等)证书攻击
- BloodHound / SharpHound 攻击路径
- NTLM Relay / Coercer 强制认证
- 本地提权到域路径(Potato 等作为跳板)
与 attack-chain 关系
- 多阶段从外网到域控 → PRIMARY 可仍是
attack-chain/,本 skill 为 AD 专科 - 已在域内专注身份 → PRIMARY = 本 skill
工作流
1. 枚举
# 示例 Impacket / 内置(需凭据与授权)
nxc smb <range> -u user -p pass
bloodhound-python -d domain.local -u user -p pass -c All -ns <DC>
2. 常见路径(先图后枪)
□ Kerberoast / AS-REP → 离线破解
□ ACL 滥用(GenericAll/WriteDacl)
□ 委派(非约束/约束/基于资源)
□ AD CS 模板错误 → Certipy
□ 中继:LLMNR/NBT-NS + ntlmrelayx(确认授权)
3. 凭证与横向
□ secretsdump / lsassy / mimikatz(严格授权与清理)
□ PtH / PtT / 黄金票仅在授权红队范围
□ 每步写 Evidence;高危等用户确认
工具链
| 工具 | 用途 |
|------|------|
| BloodHound / SharpHound | 路径图 |
| Certipy | AD CS |
| Impacket / NetExec | 横向与枚举 |
| Rubeus / Mimikatz | 票据与凭证(授权) |
| Coercer / Responder | 强制认证 / 投毒 |
参考
references/ad-attack-paths.md../pentest-tools/references/network-attack-defense.md../attack-chain/- seeds:
field-journal/seed-005_ad-certipy-esc1.mdseed-007_ntlm-relay-coercer.mdseed-013_kerberoasting-spn.md
路由上下文
上游: MASTER R24
下游: 报告 docs-generator;需 EDR 研究 edr-bypass-re
MUST NOT: 无授权 DCSync / 黄金票打生产
任务完成自检
- [ ] 是否先有图/枚举再有利用?
- [ ] 是否记录可复现命令并脱敏?
- [ ] 是否遵守 scope 禁止项?
- [ ] Checklist?
Limitations
- Domain attacks can destabilize production AD; stage in labs first.
- Relay attacks need signing-disabled targets; modern defaults block many paths.
> Adapted from zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill (MIT).
想直接用这个技能?
本站把开放许可(MIT / Apache 等)的技能按仓库打包整理到网盘,点一下转存到你自己的网盘,不用一个个从 GitHub 拉。许可未声明的技能只给原始仓库链接,不打包。
同名技能的其他版本
有 3 个不同仓库或目录里都有叫 windows-ad 的技能。它们内容并不相同,别混用:
- sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills — Authorized Active Directory and Windows identity attacks: Kerberos abuse, AD CS escalation
- sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills — Authorized Active Directory and Windows identity attacks: Kerberos abuse, AD CS escalation