detecting-dll-sideloading-attacks

Detecting DLL Sideloading Attacks

When to Use

• When investigating potential DLL hijacking in enterprise environments
• After EDR alerts on unsigned DLLs loaded by signed applications
• When hunting for APT persistence using legitimate application wrappers
• During incident response to identify trojanized applications
• When threat intel indicates DLL sideloading campaigns targeting specific software

Prerequisites

• EDR with DLL load monitoring (CrowdStrike, MDE, SentinelOne)
• Sysmon Event ID 7 (Image Loaded) with hash verification
• Application whitelisting or DLL integrity monitoring
• Software inventory of legitimate applications and expected DLL paths
• Code signing verification capabilities

Workflow

1. Identify Sideloading Targets: Research known vulnerable applications that load DLLs without full path qualification (LOLBAS, DLL-sideload databases).
2. Monitor DLL Load Events: Query Sysmon Event ID 7 for DLL loads where the DLL path differs from the application's expected directory.
3. Check DLL Signatures: Flag unsigned or untrusted DLLs loaded by signed executables.
4. Detect Path Anomalies: Identify legitimate executables running from unusual locations (Temp, AppData, Public) that may be decoy wrappers.
5. Hash Verification: Compare loaded DLL hashes against known-good versions and threat intel feeds.
6. Correlate with Process Behavior: Check if the host process exhibits unusual behavior (network connections, child processes) after loading the suspicious DLL.
7. Document and Remediate: Report sideloading instances, quarantine malicious DLLs, and update detection rules.

Key Concepts

| Concept | Description |

|---------|-------------|

| T1574.002 | DLL Side-Loading |

| T1574.001 | DLL Search Order Hijacking |

| T1574.006 | Dynamic Linker Hijacking |

| T1574.008 | Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking |

| DLL Search Order | Windows DLL loading priority path |

| Side-Loading | Placing malicious DLL where legitimate app loads it |

| Phantom DLL | DLL that legitimate apps try to load but does not exist |

| DLL Proxying | Malicious DLL forwarding calls to legitimate DLL |

Tools & Systems

| Tool | Purpose |

|------|---------|

| Sysmon | Event ID 7 DLL load monitoring |

| CrowdStrike Falcon | DLL load detection with process context |

| Microsoft Defender for Endpoint | DLL load anomaly detection |

| Process Monitor | Real-time DLL load tracing |

| DLL Export Viewer | Verify DLL export functions |

| Sigcheck | Digital signature verification |

| pe-sieve | PE analysis for proxied DLLs |

Common Scenarios

1. Legitimate App Wrapper: Adversary copies signed application (e.g., OneDrive updater) to temp folder alongside malicious DLL with same name as expected dependency.
2. Phantom DLL Exploitation: Malicious DLL placed in PATH location where legitimate app searches for non-existent DLL.
3. DLL Proxy Loading: Malicious version.dll proxies all exports to real version.dll while executing malicious code on DllMain.
4. Software Update Hijack: Attacker replaces DLL in update staging directory before legitimate updater loads it.

Output Format

Hunt ID: TH-SIDELOAD-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Technique: T1574.002
Host Application: [Legitimate signed executable]
Sideloaded DLL: [Malicious DLL name and path]
Expected DLL Path: [Where DLL should legitimately be]
DLL Signed: [Yes/No]
App Location: [Expected/Anomalous]
Host: [Hostname]
Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]