secure

Secure — Security Review

Iron Law

NO DEPLOYMENT WITHOUT SECURITY REVIEW OF ALL CHANGED FILES. Every code change is a potential attack vector.

Process

Step 0: Load Engagement Context (Optional)

Check for engagement scoping:

cat .harness/engagement.md 2>/dev/null

If .harness/engagement.md exists:

1. Parse the Scope, Constraints, and Exclusions sections
2. Restrict security checks to in-scope components
3. Apply rules of engagement (method, rate limits, no-exfil rules)
4. Skip findings matching exclusion patterns
5. Include engagement reference in report header

If not found: apply full OWASP Top 10 checklist (default behavior). No scope restrictions.

See references/engagement.md for the engagement file format.

Step 1: Identify Security-Relevant Changes

Identify security-relevant changes from the diff (auth, DB, API, infra, secrets).

Step 2: Run Checklist

Run the Checklist below, marking each item as pass, fail, or N/A with reason.

Step 3: Report

For each failure, cite the file and line number with severity (CRITICAL/HIGH/MEDIUM).

Report findings using the Evidence Required section.

When to Trigger

• Authentication or authorization code changed
• Database queries written or modified
• API endpoints added or changed
• Environment variables or secrets referenced
• File upload, user input parsing, or serialization code
• Infrastructure config (Docker, K8s, CI/CD)

Checklist

Injection

• [ ] All user input sanitized/escaped before use in queries — unsanitized input is the #1 attack vector for SQL injection, XSS, and command injection
• [ ] Parameterized queries used (no string concatenation in SQL) — string concatenation enables SQL injection even with escaping; parameterized queries are the only safe default
• [ ] No eval(), exec(), or template injection vectors — these functions execute arbitrary code and bypass all input validation

Authentication & Authorization

• [ ] Auth checks on every protected endpoint — missing checks on a single endpoint exposes the entire system
• [ ] Tokens validated and not just decoded — decoding without signature verification lets attackers forge any token
• [ ] Session expiry and refresh logic correct — stale sessions allow account takeover; refresh token rotation prevents replay attacks
• [ ] No hardcoded credentials or secrets in code — hardcoded secrets end up in version control and are impossible to rotate

Data Exposure

• [ ] Sensitive data not logged (passwords, tokens, PII) — logs are often accessible to more people than the database and persist indefinitely
• [ ] API responses don't leak internal details — stack traces, DB schemas, and server versions help attackers craft targeted exploits
• [ ] Error messages don't reveal system internals — generic errors in production prevent information disclosure; detailed errors belong in server logs only
• [ ] .env files in .gitignore — committed .env files expose secrets permanently even after deletion (git history retains them)

Access Control

• [ ] RBAC/permissions checked before data access — authorization must happen at the data layer, not just the UI layer, to prevent IDOR and privilege escalation
• [ ] No IDOR (Insecure Direct Object Reference) vulnerabilities — replacing an ID in a URL should never grant access to another user's resource
• [ ] Rate limiting on authentication endpoints — without rate limiting, brute-force and credential-stuffing attacks are trivial

See references/security.md for the full OWASP Top 10 checklist.

Anti-Rationalization

| Excuse | Rebuttal | What to do instead |

|--------|----------|-------------------|

| "This is internal-only, no security risk" | Internal tools get exposed. Assume every endpoint is public-facing. | Apply the same security standards as public APIs. |

| "We'll add security later" | Security debt compounds exponentially. Fix it now or pay 10x later. | Build it secure from the start. Retrofitting misses edge cases. |

| "The framework handles security" | Frameworks provide tools, not guarantees. OWASP Top 10 still applies. | Verify framework defaults and add application-layer checks. |

| "Security review is overkill for this" | One missed injection is a breach. Every input surface matters. | Run the checklist. It takes 2 minutes, a breach takes months. |

| "We'll harden it before production" | Security bolted on later is always incomplete. | Build it secure now. Retrofitting misses edge cases. |

| "It's an internal API, no one will abuse it" | Lateral movement attacks start from internal APIs. | Internal does not mean trusted. Validate and authorize every request. |

| "I'll just disable CORS for development" | Dev shortcuts leak into production. | Use a proper CORS allow-list from day one. |

| "Engagement scoping is bureaucratic overhead" | Unscoped assessments waste time on irrelevant surface area. | Define scope once, get focused results. Opt-in only. |

Evidence Required

Before claiming security review is complete, show ALL applicable:

• [ ] Checklist above completed: each item marked pass or N/A with reason
• [ ] No secrets in code: grep -r "sk-\|password\s=" --include=".{ts,js,py}" . shows clean
• [ ] Parameterized queries used: show the query code (no string concat)
• [ ] Auth checks present on new endpoints: show the middleware/guard
• [ ] .env in .gitignore: confirmed
• [ ] Engagement context loaded (or confirmed absent): scope applied to findings

A blank checklist is not a review. Each item needs a pass or N/A.

Red Flags

• Storing secrets in code or config files committed to git
• Using HTTP instead of HTTPS for sensitive data
• eval() or string-concatenated SQL anywhere
• Skipping engagement scope when .harness/engagement.md is present
• Reporting findings outside authorized scope as blockers (informational only)