ieeesp-artifact-evaluation

IEEE S&P Artifact Evaluation

Use this once a paper is accepted and the team is deciding whether and how to

enter artifact evaluation. At S&P, AE is a post-acceptance opt-in run by a

separate committee against three badges (sp2026.ieee-security.org

/cfartifacts.html, checked 2026-07-08); the 2027 schedule and any badge

changes were unpublished at check time — 待核实 on the current AE pages.

The three badges are three different projects

| Badge | What it certifies | The actual work |

|---|---|---|

| Available | Artifact permanently deposited with a DOI (Zenodo, FigShare, Dryad — not a lab webpage or GitHub alone) | Deposit hygiene: license, README, versioned snapshot |

| Functional | Evaluators exercised the artifact per your instructions | Environment capture + scripted entry points that run elsewhere |

| Results Reproduced | Evaluators regenerated the paper's key results | Claim-to-command map with tolerances and runtimes |

Pick badges by what an outsider can genuinely re-run. A measurement study of

live infrastructure can honestly target Available (data + analysis code) even

when Reproduced is impossible; overclaiming a badge wastes the committee's

goodwill and your response cycles.

Security artifacts have handling constraints others do not

• Exploit code: release what supports the scientific claim; gate or stub

weaponization details when fixes are not universally deployed, and say so

in the README. Align with the paper's disclosure timeline — an artifact

should not out-run the patch.

• Malware corpora: ship hashes plus a documented retrieval path rather

than live binaries; if binaries are necessary, password-protected archives

with an explicit handling warning are the community norm.

• Vulnerable targets: containerize the intentionally-vulnerable service

so an evaluator cannot accidentally expose it; never require the evaluator

to scan or attack third-party infrastructure.

• Datasets with user data: only what the paper's ethics record covers —

the AE deposit is public forever.

Packaging for a stranger with a deadline

Evaluators run many artifacts in a fixed window. Optimize for their first

thirty minutes:

artifact/
├── README.md            # claims table (below), requirements, total runtime
├── LICENSE
├── Dockerfile           # or VM image reference; pin versions incl. kernel
│                        #   if the attack is kernel-sensitive
├── setup.sh             # one command; no sudo surprises undocumented
├── run_minimal.sh       # <30 min smoke path exercising every component
├── run_full.sh          # regenerates paper numbers; prints ETA up front
└── expected/            # reference outputs + tolerance notes

README claims table:
| Paper claim | Command | Expected output | Time |
| Table 3 attack success | ./run_full.sh t3 | success ≥ 0.9 ± noise note | 2 h |
| Fig 5 overhead curve   | ./run_full.sh f5 | CSV within ±5% of expected/ | 40 m |

Hardware honesty matters more at S&P than most venues: microarchitectural

attacks, timing channels, and TEE work are CPU-stepping-sensitive. State the

exact tested hardware and what changes off it — "results reproduced on

different silicon may differ in <way>" is a credibility line, not a

weakness.

Process notes

• Register for AE in the acceptance-notification window; the AE calendar runs

in parallel with camera-ready and both compete for the same author-weeks.

• Expect an interactive phase where evaluators file issues; respond with

fixes to the artifact, not prose reassurance.

• The badge outcome is independent of the paper's acceptance — a failed AE

does not un-accept the paper, but badges print on the published version.

• Keep the deposited DOI version identical to what evaluators approved.

Failure modes specific to this venue

• A "working" exploit that assumed the lab's exact microcode/patch level —

pin and document, or downgrade the badge target.

• Disclosure conflict: artifact published before coordinated-disclosure

clocks expire.

• The AE README assumes security-tool literacy the committee may not have

(e.g., unstated familiarity with a specific fuzzer's corpus format).

• Zenodo deposit made from the wrong branch after camera-ready edits.

Output format

[AE decision] opt in: yes/no — badge targets: Available / Functional / Reproduced
[Rerunnability audit] <what an outsider can actually regenerate>
[Handling constraints] exploit gating / malware packaging / user data: <plan>
[Hardware sensitivity] <exact platform + expected drift off-platform>
[Schedule] AE registration <date 待核实> vs camera-ready <date> — conflict?